Fields: microeconomic theory, information economics, organizational economics.
Published:
- Fostering Collaboration (with Joyee Deb and Aditya Kuvalekar), TE
- Perfect Bayesian Persuasion (with Doron Ravid and Denis Shishkin), JPE Micro
- Political Accountability Under Moral Hazard (with Avidit Acharya and João Ramos), AJPS
- Knowing the Informed Player’s Payoffs and Simple Play in Repeated Games (with Takuma Habu and Doron Ravid), JET
- Buying from a Group (with Aditya Kuvalekar and Nima Haghpanah), abstract in EC ’21, AER [slides]
- Persuasion via Weak Institutions (with Doron Ravid and Denis Shishkin), JPE
- Goodwill in Communication (with Aditya Kuvalekar and João Ramos), JET
- Addressing Strategic Uncertainty with Incentives and Information (with Marina Halac and Daniel Rappoport), AEA P&P [slides]
- Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework (with Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei), GEB
- Pooled Testing for Quarantine Decisions (with Doron Ravid), JET
- Rank Uncertainty in Organizations (with Marina Halac and Daniel Rappoport), AER [slides]
- Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives (with Doron Ravid), Econometrica [slides]
- Repeated Delegation (with João Ramos), JET [slides]
- Job Insecurity (with Aditya Kuvalekar), AEJ Micro
- Attention Management (with Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei), AER: Insights [slides]
- Peer-Confirming Equilibrium (with Evan Sadler), Econometrica [slides]
- Disclosure to a Psychological Audience (with Laurent Mathevet), AEJ Micro
Unpublished:
- Predicting Choice from Information Costs (with Doron Ravid), abstract in EC ’23
- Pricing for Coordination (with Marina Halac and Daniel Rappoport), R&R @ AER
- The Production and Consumption of Social Media (with Apostolos Filippas, John Horton, and Prasanna Parasurama), abstract in EC ’22, R&R @ MS
- Equivalence of Cheap Talk and Bayesian Persuasion in a Finite Continuous Model
- Simplifying Bayesian Persuasion (with Laurent Mathevet)